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Optimal Currency Basket Pegs for Developing and Emerging 
Economies 
By Joseph P. Daniels, Peter G. Toumanoff*, and Marc von der Ruhr 
 
The exchange rate arrangement represents an important policy choice for emerging and 
transitional economies as they strive to become stable and market-driven. A wide variety of 
arrangements have emerged, ranging from currency boards, basket-currency pegs and 
single-currency pegs to floating rates. Recently the IMF has recommended that, if the exchange 
value of a currency is to be pegged, it is better to peg to a basket of currencies rather than a 
single currency. Nonetheless, there has been little theoretical research on the management and 
optimal design of basket-peg arrangements. In this paper we extend the small-country 
macroeconomic model of Turnovsky to show that an optimally designed basket-peg 
arrangement can minimize the variance in domestic consumer prices as well as the variance of 
foreign reserves. The model highlights the importance of the money and bond markets and, 
therefore, the importance of various interest rate channels. Additionally we show that a 
trade-weighted currency basket is not only suboptimal, it is at odds with increasing capital market 
integration. Further our solutions illustrate that the optimal weights will evolve as the domestic 
economy integrates with the global market for goods and services, and financial instruments. 
 
I. Introduction 
In the aftermath of the 1997 and 1998 currency crises, there arose a debate on the 
appropriate exchange rate arrangement for emerging and transitional economies. Some argued 
that to bring stability to global markets, a flexible exchange rate system should be adopted by all, 
while others pressed for fixed exchange rate arrangements. Hence, arrangements that lie 
between the ends of the spectrum currency basket pegs for example-appear to have fallen out of 
favor. 
For emerging economies heavily dependent on exports the exchange rate is an important 
nominal price, and for these economies, there is a trade-off between domestic inflation 
performance and real growth that is dependent upon international price competitiveness. Frankel 
(1999, p.1) counters the claims above, arguing that no single regime a panacea, but more 
importantly, for an given country no regime is best for all time. Frankel maintains that 
intermediate regimes, as opposed to those at the end of the spectrum, are more likely to be 
appropriate for most countries. The fact remains that a large number of nations, as shown in 
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Table 1, continue to manage their currency against a basket as this arrangement provides a 
nominal guide for monetary policy as well as some limited flexibility against individual currencies. 
The choice and management of the exchange rate arrangement typically plays an 
important role in a currency crisis, especially in an emerging or transitional economy. (See Sachs 
1996 for a discussion on the importance of the exchange rate regime for transition to a market 
system.) Pegged- or heavily managed exchange rate arrangements result in relatively rigid 
nominal exchange values among involved currencies. During the period when the dollar was 
appreciating against the German mark and the Japanese yen, for example, the currencies of 
East Asian nations became overvalued relative to the currencies of other important trading 
partners. The inflexibility of the East Asian currencies caused by the exchange rate 
arrangements was a contributing factor to the crises.  
After the crises forced Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaysia to float their 
currencies, traders began searching for technical floors and policy analysts began to call for new 
approaches to exchange rate management. In the aftermath, the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) has been criticized, among other things, for not offering an alternative to a free float. 
Regarding the East Asian currency crises, however, Stanley Fischer (1997, p.6) , Deputy 
Managing Director of the IMF, stated:  
 
As more normal conditions return, the question of the optimal exchange rate system will 
be back on the agenda. There is no generally agreed answer to that question. Some 
conclusions are easy: if the exchange rate is to be pegged, it is almost certainly better to 
peg to a basket of currencies rather than a single currency.  
 
It is important to recall that some of the crisis-stricken countries had a basket-peg system 
in place at the time of the crises. The heavy weight attached to the U.S. dollar, however, resulted 
in de facto single-currency-pegs rather than intermediate regimes. As nations continue to rely on 
currency-basket-peg arrangements, the appropriate weighting of currencies comprising the 
basket becomes an important research question.  
Though an important and practical issue, optimally designed currency basket 
arrangements have received only limited theoretical treatment in the academic literature. In 
addition, these types of arrangements have not been studied in a manner that illuminates events 
such as the Central European and East Asian currency crises. This is because the literature on 
optimal currency weights tends to focus on the goods sector of the economy only (see Connolly 
and Yousef 1982, and Edison and Vrdal 1990, as examples), or focuses on developed 
economies, assuming perfect capital mobility and no currency substitution (Turnovsky 1982).  
Although these models generate interesting results, their assumptions are inconsistent with the 
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conditions that exist in transitional and emerging economies. Fortunately this gap in the literature 
has spurred recent empirical research by Kotilainen (1995), Benassy-Quéré (1999), and Ito et al., 
(1998). 
In this paper we consider the optimal design of the currency basket from a theoretical 
perspective. We take the choice of exchange rate regime as predetermined. In other words, we 
do not investigate the optimal regime here, rather we consider the optimal weights within a 
currency basket regime.1 We then develop a small-country macroeconomic model to show that 
an optimally designed basket-peg arrangement can minimize the variance in domestic consumer 
prices as well as the variance of foreign reserves. Many nations, however, simply determine 
currency weights based on trade relationships. The small-country macroeconomic model we 
employ, highlights, in addition to the real sector, the importance of the money and bond markets 
and, thus, the importance of various interest rate channels. Additionally we show that a 
trade-weighted currency basket is not only suboptimal, it is at odds with increasing capital market 
integration. Further our solutions illustrate that the optimal weights will evolve along with the 
integration of the domestic economy into the global market for goods, services, and financial 
instruments. This final conclusion provides theoretical support to the claim made by Frankel 
(1999, p. 22) that exchange-rate arrangement parameters change over time, particularly “as 
governments deliberately change their economic structure, for example increasing regional trade 
integration...” 
In Section 2 we present a small-country macroeconomic model suitable for the analysis 
of a developing or emerging nation and its choice of currency basket weights. In Section 3 we 
derive the optimal weights as an outcome of the minimization of a selected loss function, and the 
implications of the solutions are discussed in detail. Section 4 provides some relevant points for 
policymaking and a summary of our analysis. 
 
II. A Developing Country Model 
Our analysis is derived from a model of a small open economy that is linked to two large 
economies through the goods, money, and bond markets. The currency of the small economy is 
pegged to a basket of two currencies. Much of the research on currency baskets focuses on the 
goods sector only. (See Edison and Vrdal, 1990, as an example). Turnovsky (1982), however, 
considers the currency basket in the context of a more general macroeconomic model, and the 
currency weights as outcomes of optimal policy-making. By assuming perfect capital mobility and 
no currency substitution, Turnovskys model applies to developed economies. 
We add to the macro-model based analysis of currency basket pegs by including two 
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important aspects of emerging and developing economies; currency substitution and imperfect 
capital substitution. Our approach is to extend Turnovsky’s model by allowing domestic bonds to 
be imperfect substitutes in international bond markets. We also incorporate currency substitution, 
allowing private agents to hold and transact with foreign currencies, which, in some of the 
economies considered here, has been a significant concern (Sahay and Végh, 1995). 
The various equations of the model are common in the literature and we draw directly 
from the model of Daniels (1997) for equations representing goods, money demand, output, and 
bond demand and balance of payments equations, and add to this Turnovsky’s (1982) 
specification of the relationship among cross-exchange rates and exchange rate policy. Finally, 
we follow Benevie’s (1983) approach to aggregating the balance of payments.  
 
A. Model Equations 
The following six equations describe the home goods, money, and bonds markets for the 
small economy. These markets are linked to two large economies denoted as country 1 and 
country 2. The currencies of the large economies are those represented in the currency basket. 
The model equations are: 
 
Aggregate Demand 
yt =a0[rt(Etct+1-ct)]+a1(p1t+e1t- pt)+a2(p2t+e2t-pt)+0tηt; a0,1,2>0, (1) 
Consumer Prices 
ct=α0pt+ α1(p1t+e1t)+ α2(p2t+e2t),       α0+α1+α2=1,      (2) 
Money Demand 
mt-pt=yt-g0rt-g1[r1t+(Ete1t+1-elt)]-g2[r2t+(Ete2t+1-e2t)]+ξt;          g0,1,2>0,      (3) 
Output 
yt=h(pt-Et-1pt);                                                          h>0,        (4) 
Bond Demand 
bft=-j0rt+j1[r1t+(Ete1t+1-e1t)]+j2[r2t+(Ete2t+1-e2t)];                               j0,1,2>0,       (5) 
bdt=q0rt-q1[r1t+(Ete1t+1-e1t)]-q2[r2t+(Ete2t+1-e2t)];                              q0,1,2>0,       (6) 
 
where the variables of countries 1 and 2 are indicated with a numbered subscript and home 
variables are not, and  
yt  log of real output,  
ct  consumer price index,  
pt log of home output price level,  
pit log of country is home output price level; i=1,2,  
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eit  log of the exchange rate, defined as units of home currency to currency i;  
i=1,2,  
mt  log of the nominal money stock,  
rt  nominal interest rate,  
Et+j expectations operator, conditional on information dated time t+j,  
ηt  home output demand disturbance, with E(ηt)=0 and E(ht 2)=s2 h ,  
ξt  home money demand disturbance, with E(ξt)=0 and E(xt 2)=s2 x,  
bft  end-of-period stock demand for foreign bonds, denominated in a common accounting 
standard,  
and, 
bdt end-of-period stock demand for home bonds, denominated in a common accounting 
standard.  
 
All variables are normalized around trend and the stochastic disturbances ht and xt are 
assumed to be independent and uncorrelated.  
Equation (1) represents the equilibrium condition for home output demand, where 
demand is positively related to domestic price competitiveness and negatively related to the 
domestic real interest rate. Equation (2) defines the relative consumer price index for the home 
economy, where ai represents the weights in the consumption basket of domestic and foreign 
goods. 
Equation (3) is the demand function for real money balances of the home economy. Note 
that we assume the income elasticity of money demand to be unity.2 The expected foreign 
interest yields are meant to capture currency substitution channels. Increases in the interest 
elasticities, g1 and g2, represent greater degrees of currency substitution.  
Equation (4) is a typical price-innovation goods supply function. The supply conditions 
could be conditioned on consumer prices as opposed to home output prices, adding greater 
detail to the model, but would not change our general conclusions. A supply shock is not 
included here because its effect it similar to a combination of a goods demand and money 
demand shock which are already included.  
Equations (5) and (6) are the demand functions for foreign and home bonds, where home 
(foreign) bond demand depends positively on the home (foreign) yield and negatively on the 
expected foreign (home) yield.  
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B. Specification of Exchange Rates and Exchange Policy  
The two exchange rates that the home economy faces imply a cross-rate between the 
currencies of countries 1 and 2. Currency arbitrage insures that  
e1t−e2t =e3t,                                        (7) 
where e3t is the exchange rate of countries 1 and 2, defined as units of country 2’s currency per 
unit of country 1’s currency. Because the home country is assumed to be a small country, the 
cross-exchange rate, e3, is considered to be exogenous to the small country. 
To examine the exchange rate policy rule, we consider a regime in which the domestic 
currency is pegged to a two-currency basket, and where the basket is a weighted average of the 
value, ε, of the home currency relative to the currency of countries 1 and 2. Therefore the policy 
rule is described as 
λ1e1t+λ2e2t =e;                   λ1+λ2=1.                          (8) 
We normalize the value of basket, ε, at unity, and, therefore, the logged value of (8) is  
λ1e1t+λ2e2t=0.                                    (9) 
Because λ1 and λ2 are linearly dependent policy instruments, there is only one unique 
weight as λ2 can be expressed as λ2=1−λ1. Equations (7) and (8) can be used to solve for the 
exchange rates e1t and e2t in terms of the cross rate, e3t, yielding e1=λ2e3t, and e2=−λ1e3t 
Given the exchange rate regime, foreign reserves are endogenous as they must adjust to 
maintain the pegged basket value. Because we assume that domestic authorities are unwilling or 
unable to sterilize foreign exchange transactions, changes in the money supply, mt, are 
equivalent to changes in the foreign reserves component, ft, which is denominated in a common 
accounting standard.3 
The exchange rate e3t is determined by the interaction of countries 1 and 2. Therefore the 
international linkage of these economies must be characterized in order to specify the 
constraints on the cross rate. Following Turnovsky (1982) we consider these two large 
economies as being characterized by perfect capital mobility. Hence, uncovered interest parity 
holds. Internally, however, the relationship among interest rates and prices is given by the Fisher 
relation. These two relationships are expressed as, respectively: 
r2t−r1t =Ete3t+1−e3t,                                  (10) 
and 
r1t =ρ1+(Etp1t+1−p1t ),                                 (11) 
r2t =ρ2+(Etp2t+1−p2t ).                                 (12) 
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Equation (10) implies that the anticipated depreciation of the currency of country 2 
relative to country 1 is determined by the nominal interest rate differential. Equations (11) and 
(12) are the Fisher relation, in which the nominal interest rate is equal to the real interest rate, ri, 
plus expected inflation. In equations (11) and (12), the real interest rate is assumed to be 
constant. Equations (10) through (12) allow us to express the expected changes in the 
cross-exchange rate in terms of the real interest rates and expected price changes of country 1 
and country 2. 
Because the home country considered here is a small country, and given that countries 1 
and 2 are assumed to be large countries, the prices, interest rates, and cross-rate of countries 1 
and 2 are taken as exogenous. In addition, these foreign exogenous variables are not correlated 
with the exogenous shocks of the small country. They are, however, correlated with each other. 
Thus, from the home country’s perspective, E(p1t)=E(p2t)=E(e3t)=0, E(p21t)=σ2 p1, E(p22t)=σ2 p2, 
E(e23t)= σ2e3, E(p1te3t)=σ2p1e3, E(p2te3t)=σ2 p2e3, and E(p1tp2t)=σ2pp. 
 
C. External Equilibrium 
A final set of assumptions is necessary to describe an external equilibrium condition. For 
the small nation, the current account surplus less capital outflows equals changes in official 
reserves. Aggregating the balance of payments equations and ignoring interest rate effects on 
trade balances [as in Benevie (1983)], the external equilibrium condition, or changes in official 
reserves, ft, can be expressed as: 
ft =a1(p1t+e1t−pt)+a2(p2t+e2t -pt)−(bft−bdt).                         (13') 
Through substitution, the condition is expressed as: 
ft=Y1p1t+γ2p2t−γ3pt+γ4rt+(λ2γ1-λ1γ2)e3t,                          (13) 
where γ1≡(a1+q1+j1), γ2≡(a2+q2+j2), γ3≡(a1+a2), γ4≡(q0+j0). If there is no goods market integration 
amongst the home country and countries 1 and 2, the parameters a1 and a2 equal 0. The more 
integrated are the goods markets, the larger these parameters become, approaching infinity and 
yielding purchasing power parity. Similarly, if there is no capital mobility, the parameters j0, j1, j2, 
q0, q1, and q2 equal zero. If there is perfect capital mobility, these parameters approach infinity 
and uncovered interest parity prevails. 
 
D. Model Solutions 
To solve the model, equations (1), (2), (4), (7), (8), and (10) through (12) are used to 
derive an equilibrium condition for the goods market, equations (3), (4), and (7) through (12) an 
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equilibrium condition for the money market, and equations (5) through (13) an equilibrium 
condition for the balance of payments. The three equilibrium conditions can be used to solve for 
the three endogenous variables, pt, rt, and ft. Solutions for these variables are proposed as 
functions of four exogenous variables, p1t, p2t, ηt, and ξt: 
pt =π10+π11ηt+π12ξt+π13p1t+π14p2t,                         (14) 
rt=π20+π21ηt+π22ξt+π23p1t+π24p2t,                          (15) 
and,  
ft =π30+π31ηt+π32ξt+π33p1t+π34p2tt                          (16) 
The solutions for the πij coefficients are derived by the method of undetermined 
coefficients and are provided in the appendix. 
 
III. Policy Objectives and Optimal Instrument Settings 
A. The Objective Function 
To derive the optimal values for the basket weights, we must first motivate a reasonable 
objective function. We assume that the objectives of the policymaker are domestic consumer 
price and exchange regime stabilization. The optimal basket weights can be derived as optimal 
outcomes by minimizing a loss function defined as a weighted average of the variance of 
unanticipated consumer price inflation and the variances of changes in foreign exchange 
reserves.4 The loss function is expressed as: 
L=µ1Var(ct−Et-1ct)+µ2Var(ft);µ1+µ2=1.                        (17) 
In other words, the policymaker seeks to smooth domestic consumer prices, but also 
desires to smooth the changes in foreign reserves that result from maintaining the exchange rate 
regime, perhaps to avoid speculative attacks on the currency. We choose this loss function 
because it is consistent with the stated objective of many of the transitional and emerging 
economies and the recommendations of the IMF (see Klacek 1995, p. 5, and Masson, et al., 
1998). By substituting equation (2) in (17), the loss function can be expressed as:  
L=µ1Var[α0(pt−Et−1pt)+α1p1t+α2p2t+(α1λ2−α2λ1)e3t]+µ2Var(ft).              (18) 
Though the domestic authority is endowed with only one unique instrument, the loss 
function (18) indicates that, to achieve its goals, the domestic authority seeks to minimize the 
variance of domestic output price innovations, the impact of foreign price and cross-rate 
variances and covariances on the domestic economy, and the variance of changes in foreign 
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reserves. 
 
B. Optimal Instrument Settings 
The optimal instrument settings are determined through the unconstrained minimization 
of the loss function (18). First we use the constraint on the weights as given in equation (8) to 
express λ2 in terms of λ1. We then minimize (18) with respect to λ1. The solutions are: 
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where the βi and ∆ identities are provided in the appendix. As has been noted in the literature, it 
is possible that one of the solutions exceed unity. That is, one weight is positive and one is 
negative. Though theoretically possible, we do not consider this outcome here. 
 
C. Importance of the Cross-Exchange Rate 
Considering the exogenous shocks that appear in the solutions given in (19a) and (19b), 
it is apparent that the cross-exchange rate is most important. In fact, if foreign prices are not 
correlated with the cross-rate, then the covariance terms do not appear in the optimal solutions 
at all. This is not to say that foreign prices are not important to the domestic economy. They do 
indeed impact on the domestic consumer price and foreign reserves. Rather it is that a currency 
basket arrangement is managed by intervening in response to changes in the cross-rate’s 
among the currencies included in the basket (see Daniels and VanHoose 1999, pp. 91-94). 
Hence, only shocks involving the cross-rate are important in determining the optimal basket 
weights.5 
We also see that (see the solution for λ2 provided in the appendix) the sign on the 
covariance terms are positive in the optimal solution for λ1 and negative in the solution for λ2. The 
intuition behind this is as follows. Given that, in Equation (7) the cross-rate is defined as units of 
country 2’s currency to country 1’s currency, then we would expect prices of country 2 to be 
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positively correlated with the cross-rate. That is, as prices rise in country 2, ceterus paribus, the 
cross-rate rises, indicating a depreciation of the country 2’s currency relative to country 1’s 
currency. In a similar manner we would expect the prices of country 1 to be negatively correlated 
with the cross-rate.  
Viewing the solution for λ1 in (19a), σ2p1e3<0, implies that as this covariance rises, the 
weight assigned to the currency of country 1, λ1, should be reduced whereas the weight assigned 
to the currency of country 2, λ2, should be increased. Likewise, because σ2p2e3>0, as this 
covariance rises, the weight assigned to the currency of country 1, λ1, should be increased 
whereas the weight assigned to the currency of country 2, λ2, should be decreased. 
 
D. Importance of Interest Rate Channels 
Turning our attention to the βi identities, which are provided in the appendix, we see that 
these identities are complex combinations of the price and interest elasticities, the degree of 
indexation in the economy (h), and the weights in the consumption basket. In much of the 
previous literature, the various interest rate channels were ignored, while in the Turnovsky model 
they only affected the domestic economy through the demand for home output. As the more 
detailed model developed here shows, the interest rate channels are much broader than this. 
Hence, the impact of foreign interest rates (and therefore the cross-exchange rate) on money 
and bond demand must be considered in determining the optimal basket weights. This assertion 
receives additional support in the following sections. 
 
E. Are Trade Weights or a Single-Currency Peg Optimal? 
Trade weights are often suggested as the appropriate weighting scheme for a currency 
basket arrangement. For example, The Economist (1997) claimed that: 
Southeast Asia needs something in-between, with more exchange rate flexibility than 
before, but without going all the way to a free float. At the very least, linking to a 
trade-weighted basket of currencies would provide more flexibility than a dollar peg. 
Contrary to these assertions, trade weights are optimal only under very restrictive 
assumptions. First, trade weights, λ1=α1 and λ2=α2, are optimal only if the consumption share of 
home output is zero, α0=0. Practically speaking this is not plausible. Viewing the optimal 
solutions in (19a) and (19b), the only other case where trade weights are optimal are when the 
identities β6 and β9 equal zero. This would require that all foreign interest elasticities of the model 
equal zero. In words, a trade-weighted basket ignores foreign shocks to the money and bonds 
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sectors as well as foreign interest rate shock effects on the demand for domestic output. Thus a 
trade-weighted currency basket would be inconsistent with calls for reductions in capital controls.  
A single-currency peg is optimal if one of the optimal basket weight solutions equals unity. 
In the case of λ1, the optimal solution equals unity only if the covariance terms, σ2p1e3 and σ2p2e3, 
are zero and if β15 equals zero, i.e., if α2=a2=j2=q2=g2=0. Or in other words, if all the elasticity 
terms pertaining to country 2 equal zero, indicating no integration with country 2 whatsoever. 
 
F. Increasing Goods Market, Money Market, and Bond Market Integration 
Another important conclusion we can draw from the solutions is that uneven integration or 
transition implies that the currency weights must change, and therefore periodic evaluation and 
changes are required. For example, if, in equation (19a), β6 and α1 increase relative to β9 and α2, 
then the weight on country 1’s currency rises with the variance of the cross-rate but falls with the 
covariance of prices and the cross-rate. Depending on which terms are most important indicates 
which direction the weights should be adjusted. 
The evidence of the previous section also implies that a low level of capital market 
integration, given by g1, g2, j1, j2, q1, and q2 in equations (3), (5), and (6), requires currency 
weights that approximate a trade-weighted scheme. Increasing capital market integration, 
however, requires an adjustment away from the trade-weights, with the appropriate adjustment 
depending on the relative importance of the two large countries and the relative importance of 
the various interest channels. Hence, a dynamic emerging or transitional economy must be 
prepared to adjust the basket weights periodically.  
 
IV. Policy Relevance and Conclusion 
The exchange rate arrangement represents an important choice for emerging and 
transitional economies as they strive to become market-driven, stable economies. A wide variety 
of arrangements have emerged, ranging from currency boards, crawling pegs, exchange rate 
bands, basket-currency pegs, to floating rates. The IMF has suggested that, if the exchange 
value of a currency is to be pegged, it is better to peg to a basket of currencies rather than a 
single currency. Nonetheless, there has been little theoretical research on the management and 
optimal design of basket-peg arrangements.  
In this paper we have shown that by pegging to a basket of currencies, the path of 
domestic prices is still subject to external shocks, including changes in the cross-exchange rates 
of the currencies in the basket arrangement. We also show, however, that an optimally designed 
basket-peg arrangement can be designed to minimize the variance in domestic consumer prices 
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as well as the variance of the nations foreign reserves. In contrast to the previous literature, the 
small-country macroeconomic model developed here, highlights the importance of the money 
and bond markets and, thus, the importance of various interest rate channels. As a result, a 
trade-weighted currency basket is not only suboptimal, it is at odds with increasing capital market 
integration. Likewise our model illustrates that the optimal weights will evolve along with the 
integration of the domestic economy into the global market for goods and services, and financial 
instruments. 
In summary, the relevant policymaking guidelines that emerge from our model is that: 
1. Contrary to arguments offered by the media and the IMF, a trade-weighted basket is not 
likely to be optimal. 
2. A through understanding of the macroeconomy is needed, particularly estimates of 
foreign price, interest, and exchange rate elasticities, for the determinations of optimal 
weights. 
3. Exogenous cross-exchange-rates are an important consideration in the management of a 
basket-peg arrangement. For practical purposes, therefore, a basket that includes a small 
number of currencies is preferred. 
4. Currency weights should be reviewed on a regular time schedule and adjustments made 
when deemed necessary. 
Though the following do not flow from the results of our analysis here, we also suggest 
that:  
5. The currency composition, and optimally determined currency weights, and intervention 
bands should be announced as should the level of foreign currency reserves and 
intervention activities. Any adjustments made to weights should be announced as should 
the rational for their change so that market participants perceive the changes and the 
new weights and intervention bands to be credible. 
 
The first is consistent with the recommendations found in the target zone literature, which 
shows that a credible band influences expectations and may have a stabilizing effect on the 
exchange rate (see Girardin and Marimoutou, 1997, for a summary). The remainder is consistent 
with the recommendations of the IMF who claim that crises, such as that experienced by Mexico, 
are worsened by the “poor quality to information supplied to both the official sector (including the 
IMF) and the markets” (Fischer, 1997, p. 8), and by Frankel (1999, p. 6) who states that 
“governments can reclaim confidence only by proclaiming policies that are so simple and so 
Daniels, Toumanoff, von der Ruhr 13 
transparent that investors can verify instantly that the government is in fact doing what it claims 
to be doing.” 
 
Notes 
1. Savvides (1993) suggests that the decision to peg the currency or to allow it to be 
flexible, and whether to peg to a single currency or a basket of currencies are jointly 
determined choices. 
2. This simplifying assumption has no impact on the general results of interest to us. 
3. If foreign exchange intervention actions can be partially or fully sterilized, then the 
domestic money supply does not necessarily move one-to-one with changes in foreign 
reserves. Sterilization, however, is beyond the scope of this paper. 
4. It can ppe shown that minimization of the variance of consumer prices is equivalent to 
minimizing the real exchange rate. 
5. Because Turnovsky (1982) uses various identities to substitute out the cross-rate, the 
importance of the cross-rate is unseen. 
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Mathematical Appendix 
Model Solutions 
pt =π10+π11ηt+π12ξt+π13p1t+π14p2t+π15e3t 
rt =π20+π21ηt+p22ξt+π23p1t+π24p2t+π25e3t 
ft =p30+p31ηt+π32ξt+π33p1t+π34p2t+π35e3t 
Π11=β2∆
−1 Π12=−a0∆
−1 
Π13=β6∆
−1 Π14=β9∆
−1 
Π15 =(β6λ2−β9λ1)}∆−1 
Π21=β3∆
−1 Π22=β1∆
−1 
Π23=β7∆
−1 Π24=β10∆
−1 
Π25 =(β7λ2−β10λ1)}∆−1 
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Π31=β4∆
−1 Π32=β5∆
−1 
Π33=β8∆
−1 Π34=β11∆
−1 
Π35=(β8λ2−β11λ1)∆−1 
Π10=a0[(g1−j1−q1)ρ1+(g2−j2−q2)ρ2][(a1+a2)(g0+j0)+q0)+a0(1+a1+a2)]−1 
Π20=−(a1+a2)[(g1−j1−q1)ρ1+(g2−j2−q2)ρ2][(α1+α2)(γ0+j0)+q0)+a0(1+a1+a2)]−1 
Π30=−{[(a1+a2)g0+a0][(g1−j1−q1)ρ1 
+(g2−j2−q2)ρ2]+(a1+a2)(a0+j0+q0)(g1r1+g2r2)}[(a1+a2)(g0+j0+q0)+ 
a0(1+a1+a2)]−1 
∆≡β1β2+a0β3 
 
Identities 
β1≡[(a1+a2)+(h+a0α0)] β2≡(g0+j0+q0) 
β3≡[(1+h)+(a1+a2)] β4≡[(1+h)(j0+q0)−g0(a1+a2)] 
β5≡β1(j0+q0)+a0(a1+a2) β6≡(a1−a0α1)β2+a0(a1+j1+q1−g1) 
β7≡(a1−a0a1)β3−β1β12 
β8≡β1[g0(a1+j1+q1)+g1(j0+q0)]+a0[(1+h)(a1+j1+q1)+g1(a1+a2)]+(a1−a0a1)β4 
β9≡(a2−a0a2)β2+a0β13 β10≡(a2−a0α2)β3−β1β13 
β11≡β1[g0(a2+j2+q2)+g2(j0+q0)]+a0[(1+h)(a2+j2+q2)+g2(a1+a2)]+(a2−a0a2)β4 
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Appendix 
Table 1: IMF Member Nations Pegging or Managing Against a Currency Basket 
Country Classification Currency Basket 
Bangaladesh Conventional 
Peg 
taka Weighted basket comprised of the currencies of 
Bangaladeshs major trading partners. 
Botswana Conventional 
Peg 
pula Weighted basket comprised of the SDR and the 
South African rand. 
Burundi Conventional 
Peg 
franc Weighted basket comprised of the currencies of 
Burundis main trading partners. 
Chile Crawling Bend peso Reference rate for band is a weighted basket 
consisting of the US dollar, the euro, and the 
Japanese yen. 
Figi Conventional 
Peg 
dollar Weighted basket of currencies comprised of the 
Australian dollar, the Japanese yen, the New 
Zeland dollar, the euro, and the US dollar. 
Hungary Crawling Band forint Reference rate for band is a weighted basket 
comprised of the euro and the US dollar. 
Iceland Exchange Rate 
Band 
krna Reference rate for band is a weighted basket 
comprised of the Canadian dollar, Danish krona, 
Norwegian krone, UK pound, Swedish krona, 
Swiss franc, and the US dollar. 
Israel Crawling Band sheqel Reference rate for band is a weighted basket 
comprised of the euro, UK pound, Japanese 
yen, and the US dollar. 
Kuwait Conventional 
Peg 
dinar Weighted basket of currencies comprised of the 
currencies of Kuwaits trade and financial 
partners. 
Latvia Conventional 
Peg 
lats SDR 
Socialist 
Peoples 
Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya 
Exchange Rate 
Band 
dinar SDR 
Maldives Conventional 
Peg 
rufiyaa Weighted basket of currencies comprised of 
Maldives trade partners. 
Malta Conventional 
Peg 
lira Weighted basket of currencies comprised of the 
UK pound, the US dollar, and the euro. 
Myanmar Conventional 
Peg 
kyat SDR 
Poland Crawling Band zloty Central rate is a weighted basket of currencies 
comprised of the euro and the US dollar. 
Qatar Exchange Rate 
Band 
riyal SDR 
Samoa Conventional 
Peg 
tala Central rate is a weighted basket of currencies 
comprised of the currencies of Samoas trade 
partners. 
Saudi Arabia Exchange Rate 
Band 
riyal SDR 
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Table 1 (continued) 
Country Classification Currency Basket 
Seychelles Conventional 
Peg 
rupee Weighted basket comprised of the US dollar, UK 
pound, French franc, South African rand, 
Singapore dollar, German mark, Italian lira, and 
the Japanese yen. 
Slovak 
Republic 
Managed float koruna Managed against a basket comprised of the 
German mark and US dollar 
Solomon 
Islands 
Conventional 
Peg 
dollar Central rate is a weighted basket of currencies 
comprised of the currencies of the Solomon 
Islands trade partners. 
Tonga Conventional 
Peg 
paanga Weighted basket of currencies comprised of the 
US dollar, the Australian dollar, and the New 
Zealand dollar. 
United Arab 
Emirates 
Exchange Rate 
Band 
dirham SDR 
Vanuatu Conventional 
Peg 
vatu Central rate is a weighted basket of currencies 
comprised of the currencies of Vanuatus trade 
partners. 
Source: IMF Annual Report on Exchange Rate Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, 1999. 
